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REFORM of American abortion laws became one of the great politi-
cal issues of the past decade. Led by California, Colorado, and North
Carolina in 1967, state legislatures have steadily, but slowly, been up-
dating century old antiabortion statutes.1 This effort reached a peak in
1970 when New York repealed its abortion law entirely.2 Yet even in
states which responded to the early pressures for change by enacting re-
form laws based on the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
recommendation,3 there has been no real satisfaction with the results.
Considered far reaching in 1967, the Model Penal Code revisions
came under attack basically for two reasons. First, since these laws re-
tained categorical restrictions on abortion (e.g., rape, incest, fetal de-
* A.B., 1959, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1963, Harvard Uni-
versity Law School; Senior Staff Attorney, National Legal Program on Health Problems
of the Poor.
** A.B., 1963, Washington University; J.D., 1967, Harvard University Law
School; Reginald Heber Smith Fellow, National Legal Program on Health Problems of
the Poor.
1. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE (Therapeutic Abortion Act) §§ 25950-25954 (West
Supp. 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-44 to 14-45.1 (1969). See also ALAS. STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-301 to 41-310 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1790-93
(Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1970 Rev.); Act I, [1970]
Hawaii Sess. Laws 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§§ 137-39 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 to 40A-5-3 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§ 435.405-.990 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.02.060-.090
(Supp. 1970-71) (adopted by referendum).
2. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) would per-
mit abortion where there is a substantial threat to the woman's physical or mental health,
a substantial threat of the fetus being born deformed, or when the pregnancy is the re-
sult of rape or incest.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
formity, or threats to the woman's physical or mental health), they were
viewed as inconsistent with the newly articulated right of women to
choose whether or not to bear children without any state interference.4
Second, categorical restrictions on abortion, accompanied as they were
by such statutory procedures as a need for committee approval and for
performance in an accredited hospital,5 placed new burdens on women
seeking the treatment, and made it especially difficult for the poor and
nonwhite to qualify.
Dissatisfied with the rate of progress and frustrated by the resist-
ance of many states, the reform movement turned to the courts. Con-
stitutional challenges to restrictive laws were made in several states,
both in defense of state criminal abortion prosecutions and in federal
declaratory relief and injunction actions. These court challenges met
with much early success," and only a few setbacks.7 Successful argu-
ments were that Victorian era abortion laws, which made criminal all
abortions except those "necessary to preserve" the woman's life, were
void for vagueness, and that restrictions on abortion per se (whether
narrow or broad) violated a woman's right to personal, sexual and
marital privacy without justification in a compelling countervailing state
interest. The equal protection argument was occasionally, but not
strongly, asserted.8
4. "The fundamental right of the women to choose whether to bear children fol-
lows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgement of a 'right to
privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family and sex." People v. Belous, 71
Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970).
5. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1202 (1970 Rev.).
6. For examples of successful challenges to criminal abortion prosecutions see
United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971);
People v. Anast, No. 69-3429 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Page, No. 1968-353 (C.P., Centre County, Pa. 1970); State v. Munson, unnumbered
(S.D. Cir. Ct., 7th Cir. 1970). For examples of successful federal declaratory relief ac-
tions see Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Il. 1971), appeal docketed sub nom.
Hanrahan v. Doe, 40 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1971) (No. 70-105); Doe v. Bolton,
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3006 (U.S. Nov. 14,
1970) (No. 70-40); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), appeal docketed,
40 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970) (No. 70-18) (abortion statute declared uncon-
stitutional but court abstained from issuing an injunction); Babbitz v. McCann, 310
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (declaratory judg-
ment for physician challenging constitutionality of abortion statute but injunctive relief
denied).
7. E.g., Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217
(E.D. La. 1970); People v. Pettegrew, 18 Cal. App. 3d 677, 96 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1971).
8. The federal district Court in Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga.
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The first case to reach the United States Supreme Court arose out
of the dismissal of a criminal abortion indictment against a District of
Columbia physician. The federal district court had ruled that the Dis-
trict of Columbia statutory phrase "necessary to preserve the mother's
life or health" was unconstitutionally vague.9 But the Supreme Court
disagreed, holding in United States v. Vuitch'0 that the qualification "or
health" was not so broad that it was beyond the ambit of normal physi-
cian decision making, and therefore it was susceptible of a reasonable,
and constitutional, construction. However, several critical issues were
left untouched. The vagueness of a statute limited to the preservation
of a woman's life remained open to question. Further, the court did
not address itself to the privacy or equal protection issues, since they
were not part of the lower court's ruling."
By the fortunes of calendaring, two cases which raise all of these
issues appear early on the Court's docket for the 1971 Term. Both
cases, Roe v. Wade'" and Doe v. Bolton," are on direct appeal from
three-judge federal district courts where the plaintiffs were successful
in obtaining declaratory judgments against the Texas and Georgia abor-
tion statutes. However, both courts refused to grant injunctive relief
so direct appeals were brought.' 4
The Texas statute is the classic nineteenth century law prohibiting
abortion except "for the purpose of saving the mother's life."' 5 In Roe
v. Wade the Texas federal court held that the law violated the woman's
right to privacy -under the Ninth Amendment, and that the law was
vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
1970), said simply: "[t]he mere fact that physicians and psychiatrists are more ac-
cessible to rich people than to poor people, making abortions more available to the
wealthy than to the indigent, is not in itself a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
." Id. at 1056.
9. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969)..
10. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
11. In the district court opinion, however, Judge Gesell made the following ob-
servation: "It is legally proper and indeed imperative that uniform medical abortion
services be provided all segments of. the population, the poor as well as the rich.
Principles of equal protection under our Constitution require that policies in our public
hospitals be liberalized immediately." 305 F. Supp. at 1035.
12. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3005
(U.S. Oct. 6, 1970) (No. 70-18).
13 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3006
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1970) (No. 70-40).
14. A direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a three-judge federal district
court lies only to review the granting or denial of an injunction against the enforcement
of a state statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
15. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1196 (1961).
ment.'a The court, however, left the Texas legislature free to delineate
conditions for legal abortion necessary to assure that they are per-
formed "by competent persons in adequate surroundings" and possibly
to protect the "quickened" fetus.
17
The Georgia statute is based on the Model Penal Code reforms,
with categorical restrictions on abortion for physical and mental health,
fetal deformity and sexual assault reasons. 18 It also requires that abor-
tion be performed only in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals, and with the prior approval of two physi-
cians other than the woman's personal physician and a hospital com-
mittee composed of three more physicians. 9 In Doe v. Bolton the
Georgia federal court struck down the categorical restrictions of the re-
form law for invading women's right to privacy, discussing but not spec-
ifying whether this right was based on the general "penumbra" of the
Bill of Rights, or on the Ninth Amendment alone.20 The court did
not hold the Georgia statute vague, nor did it extend its ruling to the
committee and other procedural requirements; these were said to be
"reasonable" exercises of the state's interest in assuring that an abortion
decision is "not undertaken lightly." 21
These two cases squarely present the Supreme Court with the full
range of issues heretofore avoided. If the cases are not remanded on
jurisdictional grounds,22 these issues will have to be faced. One of
them, perhaps the most significant in terms of its real impact on the lives
of American women but which has so far been secondary to the privacy
and vagueness arguments, is the vastly disproportionate unavailability
of legal abortions to poor and nonwhite women as compared with their
16. 314 F. Supp. at 1225.
17. Id. at 1223.
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (1970 Rev.).
19. Id. § 26-1202(b).
20. 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
21. Id. at 1055-56.
22. In both cases, the question of jurisdiction was postponed. Doe v. Bolton,
402 U.S. 941 (1971); Roe v. Wade, 402 U.S. 941 (1971). The federal district courts
granted declaratory relief, but declined to grant injunctive relief. Doe v. Bolton, 319
F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3006 (U.S. Nov.
14, 1970) (No. 70-40); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1970), ap-
peal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970) (No. 70-18). Under the direct
appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) the Court may simply determine that the in-
junctions were properly denied and leave open recourse to the circuit courts of appeal
for review of the declaratory judgments. This extremely complicated jurisdictional
issue is undergoing continued refinement and definition by the Court. See, e.g.,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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wealthier and white sisters. 23  The demonstrable consequences of this
discrimination-the deaths, crippling injuries and sterilizations from
criminal24 and self-induced abortions, along with the socially damaged
lives accompanying the birth of unwanted children when an abortion
is not an available alternative-are the most serious practical problems
resulting from our restrictive abortion laws. These grim results raise
what is probably the most difficult question of law in these cases, does
discriminatory treatment amount in any judicially cognizable way to a
denial of equal protection of the laws for poor and nonwhite women?
The intent of this article is to establish the denial of equal protection
arising from the application of abortion laws. The poor and the non-
white are disproportionately denied the fundamental rights of privacy
and of proper and lawful medical care without a compelling state inter-
est to justify the state action.
The Evidence of Discrimination Against
the Poor and the Nonwhite
On their face, laws which restrict the provision of legal abortions
to lifesaving or other specific circumstances allow for the treatment of
all women who qualify according to the terms of the applicable statute,
regardless of their race or socioeconomic status (assuming the exist-
ence of public hospitals or other publicly subsidized programs). Yet in
practice this has not been true. Racial and socioeconomic factors have
resulted in a significantly disproportionate provision of services. The
poor and the nonwhite have had to resort to criminal abortions and have
suffered the consequences. Without the legal restrictions, it is likely that
much of the inequality in treatment could be eliminated.
Disproportionate Provision of Services
Research seems to uniformly support the conclusion that restrictive
abortion laws create a double standard in the treatment of private and
23. The issue has only been touched on in the district court opinions in Doe v.
Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3006
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1970) (No. 70-40); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035
(D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
24. The term "criminal abortion" throughout this discussion has a pejorative ra-
ther than a legal meaning. It describes abortion not performed by a physician in a
hospital. Abortions performed by physicians in hospitals may themselves, of course, be
criminal if performed outside of statutory indications, but these are not within the ambit
of the phrase. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965 n.8, 458 P.2d 194, 201 n.8, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 n.8 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
indigent patients. 25  There is universally greater consideration extended
to the private patient's request for abortion, at least in part due to her
social and economic prestige.
20
The rich and the poor, it should be noted, are not treated alike:
many ethical physicians, for instance, are much more lenient in
their application of indications for therapeutic abortion to private
patients than to indigent patients on municipal hospital services.
It is the "private practice" patient, therefore, who can more readily
obtain a therapeutic abortion.
27
Since the poor lack sufficient funds for private treatment and rely
so heavily on public hospitals, denials or delays of treatment by those
institutions are tantamount to a denial of adequate medical care. Un-
fortunately, an abundance of nationwide data indicates that such has
been the case.2" In a survey of 65 randomly selected major American
hospitals, Dr. Robert Hall discovered that the rate of therapeutic abor-
tions was 3.6 times higher on the private services of these hospitals than
on their ward services. 29  Data collected from New York City by other
investigators for the period 1951-1962 revealed that:
Therapeutic abortion occur[red] most frequently among the white
25. The noted obstetrician Alan Guttmacher has observed: "Both in regard to in-
cidence and indications between patients on private and clinic services and voluntary
and municipal hospitals ... it has long been apparent ... that municipal hospitals fol-
low the letter of the law of the abortion statute much more exactly than voluntary hos-
pitals, and also that private patients are generally treated by a more lenient interpre-
tation of the law than service patients." Guttmacher, Abortion-Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 1, 11 (A. Guttmacher
ed. 1967).
26. Mandy, Reflections of a Gynecologist in ABORTION IN AMERICA 288-89 (H.
Rosen ed. 1967).
27. Kleegman, Planned Parenthood: Its Influence on Public Health and Family
Welfare, in ABORTION IN AMERIcA 254, 256 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
28. For example, in New York City between 1960 and 1962, Dr. Robert Hall
found that ". . . the ratio of therapeutic abortions to live births in the proprietary hos-
pitals was 1:250; on the private services of the voluntary hospitals, 1:400; on the ward
services of the same voluntary hospitals, 1:1,400; and in the municipal hospitals,
1:10,000. The same inequity pertains to ethnic origin. The rate of therapeutic abor-
tions per live births among white women in New York is I per 380, among nonwhites 1
per 2,000, and among Puerto Ricans 1 per 10,000. Hall, Abortion in American Hos-
pitals, 57 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1933, 1934 (1967).
29. "Hospitals vary greatly in their abortion policies. At the Los Angeles
County Hospital, which treats only clinic patients ...from 1946 to 1951 there was an
incidence of 1 therapeutic abortion per 2,864 deliveries. At the opposite extreme, one
finds reputable hospitals permitting abortion for one out of every 35 to 40 deliveries.
The variation in the hospitals surveyed by [Robert E.] Hall extended from no abortions
in 24,417 deliveries to 1 in 36 deliveries. It seems inconceivable that medical opinion
could vary so widely. Socioeconomic factors must be playing a major role in the
decision to abort in certain institutions." Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the
United States, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 37, 54 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
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population by a considerable margin. The white ratio [was]
more than five times that among the nonwhites and 26 times that
among the Puerto Ricans. (Well over 90 per cent of all thera-
peutic abortions in New York City [were] performed on white
women.) 30
A nationwide survey of all United States short term hospitals participat-
ing in the Professional Activities Survey (a nationwide hospital utiliza-
tion project) in 1963-1965, led to the conclusion that the "incidence
of therapeutic abortion was almost twice as high among white women
as among the nonwhite group."'
'a
There is nothing demonstrable in the differences of skin color or
economic condition which suggests that a substantially smaller propor-
tion of the poor or nonwhite qualify for legal abortion than do the white
and nonpoor, or that the poor and nonwhite have a substantially differ-
ent moral code concerning abortion. To the contrary, the results of a
recent study indicate that there is a "coincidence of poverty and un-
wanted births rather than a propensity of the 'poor' to have unwanted
children. 31 2 Thus, the unequal access to abortions is certainly a major
factor in the high level of unwanted births among the poor and the non-
white.33
A partial explanation for the marked disparity in abortion avail-
ability to racial and economic classes appears to lie in the far lower
incidence of abortions performed for psychiatric reasons among poor
and nonwhite women. In an era when nonpsychiatric medical reasons
for abortions have steadily decreased, a steadily increasing number of
abortions have been performed for psychiatric reasons.34 Poor and
30. Gold, Erhardt, Jacobson, Nelson, Therapeutic Abortions in New York City:
A 20-Year Review, 55 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 964, 966 (1965).
31. Tietze, Therapeutic Abortions in the United States, 101 Am.. J. OBsT. &
GYNEc. 784, 786 (1968).
32. Bumpass & Westoff, The "Perfect Contraceptive" Population, 169 Sci. 1177,
1179 (1970). Of births occurring between 1960 and 1965, investigators concluded that
one-third of Negro (as contrasted with one-fifth of white) births were unwanted. "This
high level of unwanted births among Negroes indicates the magnitude of the burden of
unwanted dependents that is borne by this population .... " Id.
Unwanted births were in general more than twice as high for families with incomes
of less than $3000 as for those with incomes of over $10,000; this differential was "par-
ticularly marked among Negroes." Id.
33. Federal courts recently examined procedures at the District of Columbia Gen-
eral Hospital and ordered an immediate liberalization of those procedures to allow its
predominantly poor and black patients fair access to the abortion treatment. Doe v.
General Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.D.C.) affd in part, 434 F.2d 423 & 434 F.2d 427
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
34. Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indications for Therapeutic
Abortion, in ABORTION iN Aminuc 12 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
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nonwhite women have not been the recipients of this treatment to the
same extent as other women. This discrepancy
may be attributed to the higher incidence of abortions for psychiatric
indications among private patients. Whereas at Sloane Hospital
[for Women, in New York City] one therapeutic abortion was per-
formed for psychiatric reasons per 1,149 deliveries on the ward
service, the comparable ratio for the private service was one per
104 . . . . It would appear therefore that private patients with
unwanted pregnancies are more often referred for primary psy-
chiatric evaluation and/or that psychiatric justification for abortion
is more easily obtained for private patients.
35
Dr. Hall's survey of 65 major hospitals confirms the same wide
discrepancy in granting psychiatrically-related abortions.36 This phe-
nomenon has occurred perhaps because
by the very nature of things, ward patients are less likely to have
the necessary consultations requested, including the psychiatric,
and to have the necessary recommendations made and accepted by
a hospital board, than are their well-to-do sisters. Ethical and con-
scientious physicians decry this fact, but nevertheless find it im-
possible to controvert .... 37
"Reform" legislation, of the Georgia type (requiring sexual as-
sault, fetal deformity, or probable adverse effects on physical or mental
health),38 has not proved an answer to the problem. As Professor
Packer notes:
Our abortion laws present a classic case of the operation of the
crime tariff. Given the inelasticity of the demand for abortions,
the legal prohibition has the effect of raising the risk and reward
for the illegal practitioner and also of depressing the quality of the
services offered. This phenomenon will not be relieved to any
appreciable extent by the moderate or "therapeutic abortion" ap-
proach to law reform. . . . [I]t must be recognized that moderate
reform is essentially middle-class reform. It benefits those who
are sufficiently well educated, well connected and well financed
to take advantage of the liberalized law. Where will the ghetto-
dweller find a psychiatrist to testify that she runs a grave risk of
emotional impairment if she is forced to give birth to her nth
baby?39
Resort to Criminal Abortion
[Wihile socioeconomic conditions never per se legally warrant
therapeutic abortion, socioeconomic status nevertheless frequently
35. Hall, Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilization and Contraception, 91 AM. J. OBsr.
& GYNEC. 518, 519, 522 (1965).
36. Id. at 518.
37. Rosen, A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, in ABoRTIoN IN AMERiCA 299,
306-07 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (1970 Rev.).
39. H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANcIoN 343-44 (1968).
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determines whether or not an abortion will be performed, and if
performed, whether that self-same abortion will be therapeutic or
criminal.
40
Criminal abortion has been described as the greatest single cause
of maternal mortality in the United States; it is also one of the greatest
causes of disease, infection, and resulting sterilization. 41  The poor and
the nonwhite suffer disproportionately from the "back-alley" abortion-
ists, whose services they seek out in lieu of the medically safe hospital
abortions generally denied them. The often tragic results are well doc-
umented. For example, during the first full year of operation of Cali-
fornia's 1967 reform law, approximately 7 percent of the state's non-
white female population subjected themselves to criminal abortion, as
opposed to only 11/2 percent of the state's white female population.
42
Such statistics are typical of findings throughout the country.43
Equality of Treatment When Restrictions Are Removed
Since July 1, 1970, when all categorical restrictions on abortion
were eliminated in New York, the state has experienced a sharp reduc-
tion in criminal abortions. New York City health officials have reported
that the city's public hospitals, with all abortions restricted to city
residents, were performing an average of 511 a week, and that the
"vast majority" of those women would be unable to afford abortions
40. Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hy-
pocrisy, 17 W. Rls. L. Rlv. 435, 450 (1965) (emphasis added).
41. For a discussion and extensive list of medical citations concerning the con-
sequences of criminal abortion see People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965-66, & 966 nn.9
& 10, 458 P.2d 194, 201 & 201-02 nn.9 & 10, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 & 361 nn.9 & 10,
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
42. BuREAu OF MATERAL AN CHmD HEALTH, CALiFORNA DEP'T OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEOISLATURE ON THE IM-PLEMENTATION OF THE
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT, table 4 (1970).
43. In their New York study, Drs. Gold, et al., noted that the ratio of criminal
abortion deaths per 1,000 live births was 4.0 for white women, 8.5 for Puerto Ricans
and 16.2 for nonwhites. Gold, supra note 30, at 970-71. Likewise, Dr. Hall's 1960-62
study led him to conclude that approximately half of the puerperal deaths among New
York's Negroes and Puerto Ricans were due to criminal abortions as opposed to only a
quarter of the puerperal deaths among white women. Hall, supra note 28, at 1934.
In Georgia, nonhospital abortions caused the deaths of 205 residents between 1950 and
1969; of these 205 nonhospital abortion deaths, 143 (70%) were of black women; of
the 25 Georgia women who died as the consequence of illegal abortions between 1965
and 1969 ("reform" legislation was passed in 1968), 22 (88%) were black; and, while
the abortion mortality rate for white Georgia women fell 80% from 1950-54 to 1965-69,
abortion mortality among black Georgia women declined by only 33% between the
same two five-year periods. "Nonhospital abortion mortality in Georgia is primarily a
black health problem." CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EnUCATION & WELFARE, ABORTION SURVELLANCE REPORT 10 (1970).
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in private hospitals. Of the city residents obtaining abortions, about
half had them performed in municipal hospitals or, as charity cases, in
voluntary institutions." A later report, issued on June 29, 1971, was
even more revealing:
In the first six weeks, non-whites and Puerto Ricans, who had little
access to legal abortions prior to the law, received half the abor-
tions . . . . In the first nine months, 31 % of the city's abor-
tions done on state residents were reimbursable under Medicaid. 4
A beneficial side-effect of the change has been a drop in the maternal
mortality rate; New York City hospitals reported a huge drop in
botched criminal abortions. 46 Thus, it is clear from the evidence that
where the law has eliminated restrictions on obtaining abortions, poor
and nonwhite women who were previously unable to exercise the finan-
cial and other kinds of leverage required to have a "therapeutic" abor-
tion are able to obtain medically safe abortions on a relatively equal basis
with all women.
The Legal Impact on Equal Protection of
Discrimination Against the Poor and Nonwhite
A Preliminary Look at Due Process
Before drawing any conclusions from the given data, it is impor-
tant to consider the nature of the interests which are in conflict in the
abortion cases and the strategic usefulness of an equal protection argu-
ment. The courts which have thus far invalidated state abortion laws
have done so on essentially due process grounds, either ignoring or
briefly passing over any equal protection problems.4 7 Is equal protec-
tion, then, only a makeweight argument? The answer lies in the rela-
tive difficulty of identifying the individual and state interests involved
and resolving their conflicts. While the traditional process of identifi-
cation and resolution is similar in both due process and equal protec-
tion analyses, it may be less difficult under equal protection in certain
ways which are relevant to the abortion cases. Under both approaches
violations are predicated on establishing that the state law infringes a
"fundamental" personal interest without a "compelling" state justifica-
tion-a crude formulation of the balancing test, but one which is ba-
44. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1971, at 25, col. 5.
45. American Medical News, July 12, 1971, at 9, col. 1.
46. "The maternal mortality rate-to which criminal abortions have always con-
tributed a major portion-is now at a record low of 2.3 per each 100,000 live births,
compared with 5.2 at this time last year." Id.
47. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
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sically accurate. 48
Fundamental Interest: Right to Privacy
It is not difficult to find constitutional authority for a "funda-
mental" right to privacy which would subsume abortion. A right to the
privacy of one's own body was found in Terry v. Ohio49 where the
United States Supreme Court said, "[N]o right is more sacred . . . than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person . "... 0 Intrusions on the sanctity of the body may only be up-
held for compelling reasons, such as vaccination to protect the rest of the
population from disease.51 Even if a refusal to permit bodily intrusion
would result in death, as by refusing medical treatment, the decision
would be upheld if the person was competent to make it.52
Privacy in matters relating to procreation, marriage, and family
sanctity are also strongly supported. In Skinner v. Oklahoma 3 the
Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection and due process grounds
an Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization of certain felons, de-
claring that there is a fundamental interest to be protected by the Con-
stitution in the "right to have offspring. ' 54 In Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters55 the Court found a fundamental right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to send one's children to private school, which is derived
from "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control." 56  In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,57 concerning a ban on the teaching of German in school, the
Court articulated the fundamental interest being asserted by the par-
ents there as a Fourteenth Amendment "right of the individual to
. . . marry, establish a home and bring up children" as they see fit. 8
In Loving v. Virginia"9 the Court found a ban on interracial marriage
to deny due process of law based on the fundamental "freedom to
48. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1120-23 (1969).
49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50. Id. at 9, quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
51. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
52. Cf., e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
53. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54. Id. at 536.
55. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
56. Id. at 534-35.
57. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
58. Id. at 399.
59. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
marry . . . one of the vital personal fights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."6 The case closest to point, and on
which the strongest reliance is based, is Griswold v. Connecticut.6'
In Griswold the Court struck down Connecticut's ban on contraceptives
as applied to doctors and their married patients, as an infringement of
the right to privacy in marriage.
These cases indicate that there are certain areas of one's private
and family life which are no one else's business; that a woman should
be permitted to withdraw into this zone of personal privacy without
hindrance by the state; that the interests of marriage and family are
vitally involved in the decision not to have a child; and that women
cannot be constitutionally compelled to be vessels for propagation. Es-
pecially under Griswold, abortion would seem to qualify as funda-
mental. According to Justice Clark:
Griswold's act was to prevent formation of the fetus. This, the
court found, was constitutionally protected. If an individual may
prevent conception, why can he not nullify that conception when
prevention has failed?6 2
The "why not" may be found in the weight to be given the state's
competing interests:
The critical issue is not whether such rights exist [for women who
wish abortions], but whether the state has a compelling interest in
the regulation of a subject which is within the police powers of the
state .... 63
The State's Competing Interests
There are four conceivable state interests being furthered by abor-
tion law restrictions: to protect the health of a woman, to deter prom-
iscuity, to increase the population, and to protect the fetus. Abortion
laws of the nineteenth century were designed to protect women's health.
At common law, abortion was not a crime before quickening of the
fetus, but the high death rate from surgical procedures in the mid-
1800's led to the enactment of statutes permitting abortion only where
a woman's life itself was threatened.6 4  The balancing test being ap-
60. Id. at 12.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Clark, Religion, Mortality and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 Loy-
OLA L. REV. 1, 9 (Los Angeles 1969).
63. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 964, 458 P.2d 194, 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
360 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
64. See State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1858); Means, The Law of
New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of
Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 508 (1968).
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plied then was not between mother and fetus, but between the probabil-
ities of the mother's death with or without surgery. This interest is no
longer served, since hospital-performed abortion early in pregnancy is
considerably safer than normal childbirth.65
As a deterrent to illicit sexual activities, the state may enforce pro-
hibitions against those activities directly. "It may not do so, however,
by making the penalty a personally, and socially, undesired preg-
nancy." 66 In addition, if an antiabortion statute's purpose is deterrence
of sexual promiscuity, there is a serious problem of overbreadth when
it is not restricted to pregnancies resulting from such illicit relation-
ships. 67
Today, no serious state interest can be found in increasing the
population. While laws making abortion a capital offense in Nazi
Germany and ancient Sparta had this specific purpose,68 the current
policy of government is to encourage population control. 69 Also, a ban
on contraception would be a more direct means of increasing popula-
tion, and such a ban has been held unconstitutional in Griswold v. Con-
necticut70 and Baird v. Eisenstadt.71
But the states have not asserted protection of women's health, de-
terrence of promiscuity, or population increase as serious interests. All
three are indistinguishable from interests that would have applied in
Griswold and that would not have received the Court's protection there.
However, the final interest, protection of the fetus, is distinguishable
from Griswold and is not quite as simple as Mr. Justice Clark's "why
not?" would make it seem. According to a reliable eyewitness at the
oral argument in Vuitch, Justice Black waived his arm irritably when
65. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965, 458 P.2d 194, 200-01, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 360-61 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); Tietze, Mortality with Con-
traception and Induced Abortion, 45 STUDIEs IN F iLUY PLAN ING 6 (1969).
66. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970), prob. juris. noted,
401 U.S. 934 (1971). The court of appeals in Baird extended Griswold's constitu-
tional protection of contraception to unmarried persons.
67. Cf., e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
68. See Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding
Laws, 33 S.; CAL. L. REv. 123, 126 (1962).
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 705(a)(12) (Supp. V, 1970); 45 C.F.R. § 220.20 (1971)
(prevention or reduction of birth out-of-wedlock); id. § 220.21 (1970) (family planning
assistance in accordance with federal maternal and child health programs and aid to
families with dependent children program); Family Planning Services and Population
Research Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504, U.S. CODE CONG. & AnMsN.
NEws 1748 (1970).
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
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counsel for the doctor tried to gloss the distinction, saying "Don't tell
me that. There is something there!"'7 2  Just what that something is
raises the most serious issue for theologians, for legislators and, now,
for judges.
Opposition to legalization of abortion is often premised on the
fetus having a "right to life." A primary argument against this proposi-
tion, equating as it does a one-day-old embryo with a human being, is
the existence of any abortion laws. If a fetus has the same due process
right to life as an existing person, how does one justify the abridgement
of that right when a mother's life is in danger, when a mother's health
is threatened, when a fetus is deformed, or when a fetus is threatening
no harm and is perfectly formed but is the product of rape? If a
fetus is indeed a human being, any provision for abortion smacks of
Hitlerism, an argument not lost on opponents of reform.
The proposition that a fetus is a human being finds no support
at common law or in the Constitution. At common law, abortion was
permitted before quickening. 73 The woman's right to abortion was even
termed "an ancient common-law liberty" until abolished by statute be-
cause of the surgical mortality rate in the nineteenth century. The
Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on "all persons born . ..
It has been argued that the fetus has gained certain other rights
over the years which help establish the intent of legislatures to give it
a right to life. 75  Among these are such things as inheritance of prop-
erty, 6 suing to recover for prenatal injuries,' 7 and blood transfusions
despite the mother's religious objections.7'8  To the contrary, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Belous, said that "all of the statutes
and rules relied upon [to support the right to life] require a live birth or
reflect the interest of the parents. '79  For example, ownership of prop-
72. Address by Professor Cyril Means of New York University Law School be-
fore University of California Medical Extension Symposium on "Therapeutic Abortion,"
International Hotel, Los Angeles, Jan. 23, 1971.
73. See 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 50.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
75. E.g., Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in THE MORALITY OF ABOR-
TION 220-30 (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
76. Id. at 220-23.
77. Id. at 226-30.
78. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (discussed in text accompanying note 82
infra).
79. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 968, 458 P.2d 194, 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1969), cerl.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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erty by inheritance is wholly dependent on live birth, 0 and a suit for
prenatal injuries lies only if a fetus is born alive."'
The recent blood transfusion case of Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hospital v. Anderson"2 seems to go farther in establishing the
fetus's right to life. To save a fetus, the court ordered a woman to
undergo a blood transfusion which she had refused on religious grounds.
But in Raleigh, the pregnancy was not unwanted nor medically contra-
indicated. The right asserted was freedom of religion, not freedom to
choose whether to bear a child. The parents actually desired that the
child be born alive but felt compelled to follow the doctrines of their
religious faith. In the abortion situation, on the other hand, the inter-
ests of the woman and the fetus are in opposition. Bearing the fetus
may itself be a direct threat to the woman's right to personal, marital,
sexual and family privacy. The fetus' "rights" where abortion is sought
may thus be viewed differently than in the Raleigh context.
According to science, human life does not commence at the mo-
ment of conception. Such a proposition cannot be supported.
It is said that, as a biological fact, life begins with the fertilized
ovum. But in one sense "life" began in the prehistoric slime and
has been continuous since. The question is not when life begins
but when human personality begins. This is where the phrase
"the unborn child" subtly begs the question.
The phrase "unborn child" can be used, without offense to
common sense, in respect of the viable foetus, that is, after about
the seventh month of pregnancy, when the foetus is capable of
surviving apart from the mother. But the farther one goes back
in the development of the foetus the more questionable its applica-
tion becomes.83
Thus, while the state may contend it has a compelling interest in
the protection of the fetus, its interest is not necessarily compelling
with respect to all fetuses, specifically those which are not yet viable.
Some courts, dealing with abortion laws that draw no fetal age lines,
have themselves drawn an age line to set a point of viability, and have
held that the state's interest was not compelling before that point,8 4
relying perhaps in part on the common law precedent, but relying in
80. Id. at 968 n.12, 458 P.2d at 202 n.12, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.12; see T.
ATruNsoN, THE LAw OF WILLS § 20 (2d ed. 1953). Contra, Louisell & Noonan, supra
note 75, at 222.
81. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
82. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
83. G. WLLIAMS, THE SANcrITY OF LjFE AND THE Canmmi. LAW 197 (1957).
84. See, e.g., Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Babbitz v.
McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
large part on common sense.
The Conflicting Interests Under Equal Protection
By whatever debatable process the Supreme Court uses to identify
the kind and quality of interests deemed fundamental under the equal
protection clause, it is at least fairly clear that "every interest found to
be fundamental and therefore protected by the due process clause will
also be fundamental under the equal protection clause ... ."' One
way of describing this broader range of equal protection interests is by
recognizing that there are some interests or benefits the state may not be
obliged to protect or confer as a matter of "fundamental fairness" or
"ordered liberty,"86 but if specific interests or benefits are protected or
conferred by the state, individuals denied them suffer a "severe detri-
ment."87  There must be strong justification for such a detriment. A
classic example is Griffin v. Illinois,"8 where the court held that the
state was not bound by due process to provide appeals from criminal
convictions, but if appeals were provided the state could not deny them
to defendants unable to afford transcripts. Thus, it is certainly not
equality of treatment, per se, which is a fundamental interest, but a
confluence of unequal treatment to a group possessing a certain trait
(e.g., poverty), and an interest which is somehow "important" or "fa-
vored," though not necessarily within the constitutional penumbra re-
quired for due process protection.89
Fundamental Interest: The Right to Proper and Lawful Medical Care
In the abortion cases, the fundamental interest may be identified
as one of receiving proper and lawful medical care, which is available
to the white and the wealthy. It is not necessary to argue that abortion
itself is a constitutional right. Expressed as an equal protection right,
the interest in receiving an abortion on the same terms as others receive
them may more easily be considered "fundamental."
Competing State Interests
One interest a state might assert to justify its strict regulation of
abortions could be its interest in decreasing the number of abortions.
85. Developments, supra note 48, at 1130.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
89. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment to The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7 34 (1969).
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Under this argument, the state has a valid concern for the fetus, or per-
haps with the general moral climate of the community, so abortions
ought to be somewhat difficult to get, like divorces90 or saloon licenses.
This justification may be rational but, as a prohibition against that
which is lawful-and abortions are lawful under certain exigent circum-
stances-it contains the seeds of its own destruction. In the equal pro-
tection context, the state must justify its classifications, not merely
the substantive regulations. 91 When a prohibition runs against a per-
sonal interest that is important to all persons, such as proper and lawful
medical care, which cannot in any understandable way be circumscribed
by reason of race or poverty, the attempt to demonstrate a strong justi-
fication for the exclusion of disadvantaged people may be impossible.92
Developing case law is quite clear on that point. s
Another state interest might be found in the need for an allocation
of state resources. If a statute is a "mere economic regulation," the
state need .only show that resulting classifications have a reasonable
connection to a legitimate state economic purpose. The Supreme Court
confirmed this view in Dandridge v. Williams,94 upholding maximum
state welfare grants against an equal protection challenge by large fam-
ilies who received less per capita under the maximum grants.
It is difficult to perceive the reasoning process that leads to the
"mere economic regulation" conclusion, particularly since Dandridge's
equal protection argument was based on a fairly strong interest, a sub-
sistence income to support life itself. Dandridge was a serious setback
to advocates of a broad view of important interests, and a fatal blow
to those who asserted that a poverty classification was always "suspect,"
requiring something more than rational justification. However, Dand-
90. But cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
91. Developments, supra note 48, at 1124-31.
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., concur-
ring).
93. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), says this quite clearly. So do Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the fundamental personal interest in travel be-
tween states vs. the durational residence requirement for welfare, another rational device
to conserve state resources and assure longer term poor citizens a fair share of those re-
sources); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the fundamental
personal interest in voting vs. the poll tax, an albeit rational device to assure that the
electorate be sincere of purpose, informed and stable); and Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (the fundamental personal interest in being represented by coun-
sel on appeal vs. the rational purpose of conserving financial and judicial resources by
having appellate courts decide which indigent appeals would be "helped" by appointment
of counsel).
94. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
ridge does not leave the abortion cause without hope. The Court care-
fully excepted from its economic regulation analysis cases wherein the
classification infringed a fundamental right, citing the right to travel
as an example. 95 Thus, the fundamentality of the abortion interest
is still an open question. Moreover, it is conceptually difficult to dis-
pose of abortion cases with a Dandridge rationale, since abortion stat-
utes serve no ostensible or underlying economic purpose.9
De Facto Wealth and Race Classifications in Abortion Laws
Before considering what weight the Court should give to de facto
wealth and race classifications in abortion laws, attention must be paid
to the question of the state's culpability in causing the discriminatory
result. 97  Evidence indicates that state policies are one cause of the de
facto discrimination.9 It is true that without state abortion law the
poor and nonwhite would still have only limited access to abortions be-
cause of factors such as their inability to pay for the service, their not
having a family physician, or the limited number of free and subsidized
care facilities in the community. Nevertheless, it is clear that the state's
entry into the field seriously aggravates these limitations. If a state
chose not to regulate abortions, the prevailing standards of medical prac-
tice in the United States would sanction the performance of abortions
without categorical restrictions.99
The artificial limitations imposed by restrictive laws are of three
specific and somewhat overlapping kinds. The Georgia statute under
95. Id. at 484.
96. The one year residency rule struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), had an ostensible state budget-saving purpose, yet the Court was troubled
by the selection of one subclass of the poor, who were asserting an important interest,
to suffer the detriment. Although the state may realize some peripheral budget-saving
in public medical funds through a restrictive abortion law, the subgroup selected to lose
the funds (abortion patients) and the important interest involved (proper and lawful
medical care available to others) makes the case closer to Shapiro.
97. Although a specific finding of "state action" seems to have lost importance,
some homage is still paid to the concept. See Developments, supra note 48, at 1069-72.
98. "Our present state statutes keep the poor, not the rich, from obtaining abor-
tions." Rosen, supra note 37, at 306-07.
99. The experience in New York indicates that nonstatutory limitations notwith-
standing, and for the first time in New York's well studied medical history, the poor and
nonwhite have received a proportionate share of abortion services since the 1970 repeal.
See AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, POLICY REGARDING ABORTION (Resolution of AMA
House of Delegates, June 25, 1970); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY, POLICY ON ABORTION, discussed in Medical Tribune, Oct. 12, 1970, at 1.
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attack in Doe v. Bolton0 ° provides an instructive example since all
three forms are present.
First, all abortions are crimes with some categorical exceptions
allowed if performed by a physician.' 01 The physician's judgment,
however, is not excepted from the penal sanction unless in retrospect
it was correct-that is, unless the prosecutor or, ultimately, a "second-
guessing lay jury," views it to have been correct. 10 2  This potential
review in a court of law of a medical judgment is unique to abortion,
at least in a criminal setting, and must influence a physician's judgment.
The old saw "you have nothing to fear if you are innocent" does not
apply since, here, the act and the crime are not one and the same.
While the act is conceded, its criminality is a question of qualitative
judgment. A conscientious physician may be able to make a fair deci-
sion on the merits, but the risk that a doctor will not be able "to hold
the balance nice, clear and true"'10 is substantial. Mr. Justice Clark
has added:
[D]octors face an uncertain fate when performing an abortion.
This uncertainty will continue unless the legislatures or courts pro-
vide relief from liability.10
4
Thus, for the poor and nonwhite woman, probably without the fi-
nancial ability to shop among doctors for a favorable decision, it is
plainly all the more difficult for her to find a physician willing to accept
the risk.
Second, the law requires that two physicians other than a woman's
own approve an abortion, and this approval must receive the further
concurrence of a hospital committee of three additional physicians. 0 5
This committee approval system is a recognized and common fact even
in states without a "reform" law.' 06 The deterrent effect of the skewed
penal sanction is even more clear when so many other physicians must
consider possible prosecution, and the woman is not their personal pa-
100. 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3005
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1970) (No. 70-40).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (1970 Rev.).
102. Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 97 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting in
part).
103. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (accused deprived of due
process when tried by a local magistrate who received a fee for his criminal conviction).
104. Clark, supra note 62, at 7.
105. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b) (1970 Rev.).
106. L LADER, ABORTION 24-26 (1966); Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act.
An Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 285, 292 (1965).
tient. 10 7 For the poor, who depend on public hospitals operating under
the public eye, or at best rely on a few potential abortion providers, the
negative decision of one of these committees has the effect of a res
judicata decision. Of course, the extra cost of all these medical con-
sultations is another artificial limitation affecting the poor.
Third, the statute requires that abortions may lawfully be per-
formed only in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals (JCAH). The JCAH is a private, voluntary
accrediting body which has specific standards for abortion procedures.
It is concerned only with hospital organization and to some extent with
the general quality of patient care,10 8 concerns which may as well be
expressed in state licensing laws. Without entering the thicket of why
the accreditation requirement may itself be invalid,' 0 9 suffice it to say
that as an artificial limitation on access to abortion services, its impact
is great. One hundred three Georgia counties have no such hospital,"0
requiring the poor woman to find the funds to travel to another county,
and, once there, to find an accredited hospital which treats the poor,
even though the same poor woman may have a ready, willing and able
state licensed hospital in her own community.
In sum, the artificial limitations on access to abortion do work to
the disadvantage of poor and nonwhite women, and since such limita-
tions are creatures of the state's abortion law, the state action test of
causation for the discriminatory result would seem to be met.
Measuring De Facto Discrimination
Thus far, an attempt has been made to establish that abortion is
proper and lawful medical care and therefore should be considered a
fundamental interest at least insofar as not denying it to poor and non-
107. On this issue, the California Supreme Court has said: "The inevitable effect
of such delegation [to physicians] may be to deprive a woman of an abortion when
under any definition [of the statutory categories] she would be entitled to such an oper-
ation, because the state, in delegating the power to decide when an abortion is neces-
sary, has skewed the penalties in one direction: no criminal penalties are imposed
where the doctor refuses to perform a necessary operation, even if the woman should in
fact die . . . . The pressures . . . to decide not to perform an absolutely nescesary
abortion are . . . enormous . . . . People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 973, 458 P.2d
194, 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 366 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
108. See Silver & Worthington, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The
Need for Change, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 310-11 (1970).
109. It is being challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity.
110. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, app. G (map of Georgia) (filed
Nov. 17, 1970), Doe v. Bolton (U.S. Nov. 14, 1970) (Docket No. 70-40).
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white women are concerned; that they do not receive such medical care
on the same basis as other women because of the artificial, limited ac-
cess imposed by the state; and that the state has caused this severe detri-
ment to poor and nonwhite women without a compelling justification.
If the case has been made, one should be willing to conclude that there
is a cognizable equal protection problem.:"1
If the de facto race classifications involved here were more defi-
nitely racially motivated, this might be the case. Racially neutral stat-
utes which have the effect of denying equal treatment to a race,
whether by legislative design, n 2 abdication,1 3 or sufferance of careless
or biased administration, 1 4 will fall. Race has the status of a suspect
classification, always requiring strict scrutiny and a compelling justifi-
cation." 5 In the abortion context, however, it must be conceded that
the denial of equal treatment to the nonwhite is largely a function of
their poverty, and the weight to be given a de facto discrimination based
on poverty is more problematical. Professor Michelman suggests that
it is "precious little."" 0 At best, he says, it is founded on statutes im-
posing "payment requirements"" 7 for the exercise of the fundamental
interest at issue." 8
The standard for considering and weighing de facto classifications
111. See Developments, supra note 48, at 1120-21; Michelman, supra note 89, at
34.
112. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
113. See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
114. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
115. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). "Lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race" have been termed "traditionally disfa-
vored" in the past. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). It
would seem, however, no longer useful to speak of poverty as a trait which triggers strict
scrutiny unless at the same time there is a fundamental interest at stake. See Michel-
man, supra note 89, at 34; cf. James v. Valtierre, 91 S. Ct. 1331 (1971).
116. Michelman, supra note 89, at 35.
117. Id. at 28-29. See also Developments, supra note 48, at 1124.
118. The poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the
costs of transcripts in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and the lawyers' fees in
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), are payment requirements, although in
Douglas the payment was not so directly assessed by the state. More likely, Michel-
man believes, it was the right to vote in Harper and the traditional fair trial elements in
Griffin and Douglas which tipped the scale in these cases, and not any primary concern
about wealth classifications. Michelman, supra note 89, at 25. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), he adds, should not be treated as a wealth classification case
anyway, because the decision relied on the right to travel and the discrimination was
between two subgroups of the poor, which raises "intractable issues" for any tradi-
tional poor vs. rich analysis.
was articulated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar cir-
cumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the constitution." 9
This standard cannot be dismissed as one requiring more numerical
equality of treatment, i.e., the statute confers the same benefit or im-
poses the same burden on all persons on the same terms.'2 0 As a
standard, at least, for better or worse, Yick Wo is oriented to results.
Its logical extension produced the Griffin v. Illinois"2 criminal appeal
cost of transcripts decision, and the effect of that decision was "to re-
quire Illinois . . . to take account of economic inequities not of its own
creation.'
' 2
To dismiss the de facto discrimination in the abortion cases as con-
stitutionally meaningless would be extremely difficult. The poor are be-
ing denied a service which is lawfully available to others; the service
is of great importance to their lives and health; the denial is because of
artificial barriers created by the state-barriers which to a great extent
involve payment requirements; and the state has no strong justification
for maintaining such barriers--either to curtail the number of lawful
abortions or to rationally allocated state resources.
Conclusion
The abortion cases which will be heard by the Supreme Court dur-
ing its 1971 Term will consider three issues: whether the old-style laws
limiting abortion to preservation of the woman's life alone are uncon-
stitutionally vague; whether any categorical restrictions on abortion vi-
olate a woman's right to personal, marital, sexual and family privacy
without a compelling state interest; and whether the strong empirical
evidence of discrimination against poor and nonwhite women in obtain-
ing abortions under such laws is a denial of equal protection.
119. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
120. See Developments, supra note 48, at 1165, 1179; Justice Harlan dissented in
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), because, he said, the Court held that "the Equal
Protection Clause imposes on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing
from differences in economic circumstances . . . [producing] the anomalous result that
... to treat all persons equality means in this instance that Illinois must give to some
what it requires others to pay for ..... Id. at 34-35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
122. Developments, supra note 48, at 1178.
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In the privacy argument, the Court will be asked to determine that
abortion is an expression of these fundamental and constitutionally pro-
tected interests, best articulated in the famous birth control case Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.'23 If the Court is willing to do so, then it must
also determine an issue which was not present in Griswold-whether
the state interest in protecting a previable fetus outweighs a woman's
rights.
The equal protection argument does not require the Court to go so
far. It holds that there is infringement of a fundamental interest to
receive proper and lawful medical care which is otherwise available to
women able to pay and that the state has no compelling interest which
can justify the denial of such care to poor and nonwhite women.
One conclusion to be drawn is that the equal protection argument
is in direct conflict with the due process argument, since the former is
not based on asserting a fundamental right to abortion, per se, nor is it
based on contending the state has no interest in protecting the fetus. Its
strategic -usefulness in the cases, however, is as an important backstop
to the due process argument. If the Court is unwilling, as it may be,
to say that there is a due process right to abortion, and/or is unwilling
to say that the state has no compelling interest in protecting the previable
fetus, that unwillingness would not dispose of the problem of unequal
treatment. If successful, the equal protection argument would leave
states with the choice of forbidding abortions to all, an unlikely and
itself constitutionally questionable alternative, or changing their laws to
assure equality of treatment to poor and nonwhite women. Hopefully,
the latter will be the end result.
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

